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Abstract 
 
Acts of terrorism could have a range of broad impacts on an economy, including changes 
in consumer (or demand) confidence and the ability of productive sectors to respond to 
changes. As a first step toward a model of terrorism-based impacts, we develop here a 
model of production and employment that characterizes dynamics in ways useful toward 
understanding how terrorism-based shocks could propagate through the economy; 
subsequent models will introduce the role of savings and investment into the economy. 
We use Aspen, a powerful economic modeling tool developed at Sandia, to demonstrate 
for validation purposes that a single-firm economy converges to the known monopoly 
equilibrium price, output, and employment levels, while multiple-firm economies 
converge toward the competitive equilibria typified by lower prices and higher output and 
employment. However, we find that competition also leads to churn by consumers 
seeking lower prices, making it difficult for firms to optimize with respect to wages, 
prices, and employment levels. Thus, competitive firms generate market “noise” in the 
steady state as they search for prices and employment levels that will maximize profits. 
In the context of this model, not only could terrorism depress overall consumer 
confidence and economic activity but terrorist acts could also cause normal short-run 
dynamics to be misinterpreted by consumers as a faltering economy.
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Full Employment and Competition  
in the Aspen Economic Model:  
Implications for Modeling Acts of Terrorism1 
1.0 Introduction 
Acts of terrorism have the potential to create significant economic impacts across the 
country and across economic sectors. For example, an attack that creates widespread fear 
and reduces confidence across all consumers would have pervasive effects in many 
sectors of the economy, just as the attacks on September 11, 2001, are still being felt in 
the airline and travel industries in 2004. Likewise, an attack that targets specific 
productive sectors of the economy could create output and employment conditions that, 
when viewed in conjunction with the terrorism, could fuel an otherwise unfounded 
reduction in confidence in the economy.  
To gain a fundamental understanding of the social and economic drivers of 
terrorism-based economic impacts, we are developing, in two distinct phases, a 
microeconomic model of economic demand and supply subject to terrorism-related 
impacts. For the first phase, described herein, we developed a model of how 
microeconomic firms and employment adjust endogenously to changes in demand and in 
the number of firms. For the second phase, we are introducing consumer confidence, as 
represented by the preferences to consume, to invest savings in safe investments, or to 
invest savings in riskier but higher-yield investments. Additionally, we are introducing 
specific economic and social mechanisms for how terrorist-based shocks can propagate 
through the economy. The combined model will be able to simulate the effects of terrorist 
shocks on economic demand and supply sectors.  
In our phase-one model, households earn income and consume goods to maximize 
utility. The reservation wage required to entice each household to enter the labor market 
varies across households, and the productivity rate of firms is constant across firms. 
Under this framework, our model allows us to infer the following logic: Some households 
produce more utility by not working for a firm if their direct personal utility productivity 
is greater than the utility that is generated indirectly by going to work, getting income, 
purchasing goods from firms, and then consuming those goods.2 Full employment is 
                                                 
1 This work is funded by the Advanced Scientific Computing program of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. 
2 This is related to the notion of a household’s trade-off between work and leisure. Leisure can be 
considered as a form of consumption for the household; that is, more leisure makes the household better 
off.  However, spending time at work rather than at leisure generates income, which allows the household 
to consume goods and services. Households that can generate more utility from leisure will stay at home, 
while those that generate more utility from consumption will go to work. As described in Section 2, we 
model that switching point as a function of the ratio of wages to the price of produced goods.  
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defined as the level at which those who are willing and able to work for firms are 
employed. 
Firm-based production has become the societal norm in most cultures since firms 
typically have production technologies superior to home-based productions and these 
firms can acquire labor and capital in amounts and proportions that make them more 
productive or efficient. Productive efficiency creates higher per capita product, which can 
be distributed among workers, owners of capital, and consumers. These benefits result in 
higher real output, wages, and profits, and a higher standard of living. 
In our model, actual employment is a combined function of households’ willingness 
to work (which collectively defines the labor supply curve) and firms’ productivity rates 
(which provide the production feasibility curve and related labor demand curve). Supply 
and demand in the goods market are functions not only of the price of goods in the 
market but also of the amount of labor that households are willing to supply to firms at 
the current wage rates and goods prices. 
Two particular market equilibria are known and calculated herein, but the short-run 
dynamics of firms and households trying to reach these equilibria are not. In the 
simulations, firms producing and selling goods take available employment as given in the 
short run. Households, considering whether to work, take final goods prices as given. 
These and other short-run assumptions create “noise” for employment and prices, which 
can make equilibrium unattainable. 
This report is organized as follows. Section 2.0 describes our model of labor markets 
and goods markets. We first formulate a model of household utility maximization and 
then calculate both the labor supply function of all households and the goods demand that 
results from their income. Next, we formulate the firm profit-maximization problem and 
the related goods-supply function and labor-demand function. Finally, we calculate the 
goods-market and labor-market equilibria.  
Section 3.0 describes two sets of Aspen agent simulations: the single-firm monopoly 
case and the multiple-firm competitive case. We discuss how both sets of simulations 
illustrate the dynamics of how the economies converge to long-run equilibrium and how 
they adjust in the short run. Section 4.0 summarizes and describes the phase-two work. 
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2.0 Model 
We model a two-market, multiperiod, closed economy composed of F firms and H 
households. Each household generates utility, either by consuming purchased goods or by 
generating utility at home with its own internal productivity. Goods are purchased in the 
goods market with wages earned by working at one of the firms. Each firm generates 
profits by using labor, purchased in the labor market, to produce a good and then by 
selling that good in the goods market. 
In this model of short-run decisions, utility is defined by current consumption; 
households do not save for the future. In subsequent papers, we will model long-run 
decisions regarding life-cycle savings and consumption. 
2.1 Households 
Each household is a single potential laborer endowed with its own internal 
productivity, ρh, which represents the quantity of goods the household can produce for its 
own consumption each time period if it chooses not to work for a firm. The population of 
households has internal productivity rates uniformly distributed over the interval 
[ρmin, ρmax].   
Each household tries to maximize its utility each time period by consuming either 
home-produced goods or firm-produced goods. If consuming at home, its product is ρh. If 
consuming purchased goods, it will have earned a wage, w, from the firm and purchased 
q goods at price p in the market. Since its income-constraint equation is p × qh ≤ w, a 
household that works will be able to purchase and consume qh = w/p goods. The 
household’s problem is then to select the consumption that solves 
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Labor supply is defined by the number of households willing and able to work for 
firms. Given the uniform density function of internal productivities, [ρmin, ρmax], the labor 
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Figure 1 illustrates this supply function.  
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Figure 1. Labor supply function. 
Full employment is defined as the condition where all households for which 
ρh < (w/p) are employed by firms and the remaining are not employed by firms. 
Goods Demand 
Since each household maximizes utility by maximizing consumption, each 
household will purchase all it can, i.e., w/p. Goods demand follows as  
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2.2 Firms 
Each time period, firms use labor lf to produce output, using the production 
technology 
 ffffff llqq ×== ρρ ),( ,  (5) 
 
where ρf  represents the conversion of labor to goods. 
 
Labor is purchased in the labor market at the fixed rate w. (We could also model w as 
varying, but this would add complexity to the equilibrium and market dynamics that is 
outside the scope of this work.) The produced goods, on the other hand, are sold in the 
goods market at price pf as determined by the firm. The firm’s problem is to select the 
price that maximizes profits, i.e.,  
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the goods supply function in the goods market is  
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2.3 Market Equilibrium 
For market clearing, we have the necessary conditions GD = GS and LD = LS. We 
consider two specific cases: a single-firm monopoly economy and a multiple-firm 
competitive-market economy. To provide a reference point, we also compute some 
properties for the socially optimal economy, where firms have zero expected profits and 
all laborers that are willing and able to work are employed by firms. 
Case 1: Single Firm 
In the context of our model, a single firm will know, given Equation (1), what the 
labor response will be to the price it offers in the market.3 The firm’s problem, therefore, 
can be reformulated as 
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Sufficient conditions for maximum profit are that (1) first-order conditions with 
respect to price p equal zero and (2) second-order conditions are strictly less than zero. It 
can be shown that  
 minfwp
dp
d
ρρ
π
=⇔= ˆ         0  (11) 
 
and 
                                                 
3 In our simulations, the agents do not actually know the employment response, but as shown below, the 
functional forms of our market equations allow firms to correctly “discover” the employment response. 
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the latter of which holds for all positive values of p, ρf, and ρmin. The price pˆ is then the 
profit-maximizing price. 
Case 2: Multiple Firms 
The economy with multiple firms is a little more complicated. Instead of each 
household always purchasing from a single firm, each household randomly selects a firm, 
where firms with lower prices have higher probabilities of being selected. Specifically, if 
a firm has a price that is one-half of another firm’s price, then it has twice the probability 
of being selected by a household. Formally, a firm with price pf has a purchase 
probability of  
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In this case, a firm competing with other firms in the market has expected demand for its 
product: 
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where E[p] is the expected value of the price each household expects to see in the goods 
market, computed as the weighted average of all prices in the market. Since all firms are 
identical, in equilibrium all of the firms should be charging the same price and have the 
same expected demand.4 As with the monopoly case, it can be shown that first-order and 
second-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for equilibrium: 
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4 For an example of a case where heterogeneous firms have different prices in Nash equilibrium, see Ehlen 
2004. 
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the latter of which holds for all positive values of w and p. By inspection, not only is it 
the case that if all firms are at prices not equal to pˆ that they will move toward ,pˆ  but also 
if the firms are at different prices from each other that they will collectively move 
toward .pˆ  Finally, note that a firm will only make a profit if its per-unit revenue is greater 
than its per-unit cost, i.e.,  
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Limit Case: Socially Optimal Equilibrium 
The impact of competition on profits is bound in the limit by the socially optimal 
equilibrium. While case 2 is more competitive than case 1, firms are still earning positive 
profits, implying that potential new firms, seeing profit opportunities, could enter the 
market. Economically speaking, socially optimal implies zero profits for all firms, and 
the economy achieves full employment. To compare case 1 and case 2 with a known limit 
equilibrium, we need to calculate the number of firms necessary to create an economy 
where expected firm profits are zero.  
Inspecting Equation (15), the equilibrium price decreases monotonically with 
increasing F. Using the definition of pmin in Equation (17), the number of firms required 
for competitive equilibrium is  
 .3 minfF ρρ=  (18) 
 
The condition 
f
w
p
ρ
=ˆ  then defines the socially optimal equilibrium case. 
Figure 2 illustrates long-run demand and supply in the goods market. These curves 
are directly linked via the price-wage ratio represented on the vertical axis and intersect at 
outputs Q = 0 and Q = Q*. Due to the functional forms of the utility and profit functions, 
the socially optimal equilibrium output level is Q*, and the corresponding equilibrium 
price is pmin (from Equation (17). For any p' > pmin, a surplus is created where QB units of 
goods are produced but only QA units are purchased by households. A monopoly will set 
such price greater than pmin to maximize QB – QA. Under competition, firms charging any 
p'  > pˆ  will be undercut by competitors until the market price declines to the competitive 
equilibrium at .pˆ  Under perfect competition, pˆ  = pmin and QB – QA = 0. 
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3.0 Simulations 
To investigate whether the economy “discovers” its monopoly or competitive 
equilibrium and, if so, how this process occurs, we conducted a series of Aspen5 agent 
simulations for the single-firm and multiple-firm cases. In both cases we used the socially 
optimal economy as comparative, limit conditions. The parameters for the two cases are 
given in Table 1.  
Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
 
 
Parameter 
Case 1 
Monopoly 
Case 2 
Monopolistically 
Competitive 
 
Socially Optimal 
Competition 
     
Households     
 Number 100 100 --- 
 Internal productivity [1.0, 2.5] [1.0, 2.5] [1.0, 2.5] 
Firms     
 Number 1 5 8+ 
 Productivity 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 
Wage rate offered 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Calculated 
Optima 
    
 Equilibrium price ( pˆ ) 70.7 31.6 25.0 
 Equilibrium employment (L
s
) 29 64 80 
     
 
3.1 Agent Rules/Mechanics 
Households 
Each household monitors wages and prices every time step. If an unemployed 
household h with internal productivity ρh observes that (w/p) > ρh, then that household 
applies for employment. If an employed household with internal productivity ρh observes 
that (w/p) < ρh, then that household quits its job and leaves the labor market. Each 
employed household attempts each time period to spend its entire savings from wages on 
the purchase of goods for consumption. 
Firms 
Each firm employs an algorithm for setting the price of the goods that it sells in the 
goods market. This algorithm essentially searches for the price that maximizes current-
period profits by averaging its price and profit performance over time. We chose this 
algorithm for its ability to converge for this particular exercise. (Typically, Aspen 
employs more complex learning algorithms, e.g., Slepoy and Pryor 2002.) 
                                                 
5 For details on the structure and uses of the Aspen model, see Basu et al. 1996 and Basu and Pryor 1997. 
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Each firm also runs a simple algorithm to determine the production that will 
maximize its profits, and then tries to access the labor necessary to produce that amount 
of output. This algorithm continues to scale its labor force in a certain direction (up or 
down) so long as the firm’s profits are increasing.   
If the firm reaches a local maximum, it oscillates about that number of employees 
while perpetually searching nearby for an employment level that will increase its profits. 
Finally, each firm purchases any excess inventory of goods that it was unable to sell in 
the goods market. 
3.2 Simulation Results 
Case 1: Single Firm 
For validation, we demonstrate that all simulation variables quickly converge to their 
calculated equilibriums in the one-firm case. As shown in Figure 3, the monopoly firm 
converges its labor demand to 29, well below full employment of 80, which is the 
number of people willing and able to work at that (w/p) ratio. Said another way, the firm 
underemploys since it is getting higher profits at lower output levels. It charges a price 
near the expected monopoly price of $70, which is well above the pmin price of $25 
(Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 3. Monopoly case: Total employment. 
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Figure 4. Monopoly case: Market price. 
By restricting output, the firm makes a profit of 36 units (Figure 5), while those 
households that participate in the labor market collectively purchase 22 units (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 5. Monopoly case: Firm profits. 
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Figure 6. Monopoly case: Units consumed. 
Households that work for the firm produce two units of goods per time step (based 
on the firm productivity rate) but consume only 0.75 units, or 38% of their marginal 
product (Figure 7).   
 
 
Figure 7. Monopoly case: Average units consumed. 
Case 2: Multiple Firms 
In the second case, we ran the same simulations but with five firms instead of one. In 
the following graphs (Figures 8 through 13), green represents this competitive case, and 
red represents the previous monopoly case. In the competitive case, we find that firms 
collectively employ more labor than in the monopoly case. The number of employees 
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converges near (slightly above) the expected competitive employment level of 64 (Figure 
8), and the price converges slightly below the competitive price of $31.60 (Figure 9).   
 
 
Figure 8. Competitive case: Total employment. 
 
 
Figure 9. Competitive case: Average price. 
Comparing the two cases, we find in the competitive case that firms collectively 
generate lower profits (about half) than in the monopoly case (Figure 10) and that they 
also employ more laborers and provide higher real wages to the households than in the 
monopoly case (Figure 11). 
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Figure 10. Competitive case: Firm profits. 
 
 
Figure 11. Competitive case: Units consumed. 
We also find that under competition each household’s real wage is more than double 
the wage earned under the monopoly case (Figure 12). In the competitive case, 
households retain 1.75 units per time step (87% of marginal product), compared with 
0.75 units (38% of marginal product) in the monopoly case. 
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Figure 12. Competitive case: Average units consumed. 
3.3 Discussion 
In this economy, a fundamental role of the firm(s) is to allow households with lower-
than-average personal productivities to contribute to, and get returns from, higher-
productivity activities offered by firms. Per capita income increases for these lower-than-
average households. Increasing the number of firms will increase the returns to 
households; output and employment increases, prices decrease, and households buy more 
goods. 
In the single-firm economy, the firm gets fairly accurate short-run, if not long-run, 
information about the number of goods it can sell and about the available labor force. In 
contrast, as seen in the multiple-firm figures, the multiple-firm economy can have 
significant “noise” in both markets. More firms are asynchronously assuming their 
employment is fixed; employment shifts in and out of firms and across firms, making 
employment response difficult to interpret. Compare the total employment levels 
displayed previously in Figure 8: while monopoly employment quickly approaches 
equilibrium, the competitive employment fluctuates significantly over almost half of the 
time steps.   
Similarly, multiple firms are trying to experiment on price and reacting to the 
perceived demand response to their price. If the noise created by experimentation is high, 
the signal-to-noise ratio will be low, making convergence to equilibrium more difficult. 
Similarly, in the multiple-firm economy, as each firm is individually searching for an 
optimal price, the ever-changing set of prices from the other firms creates noise in the 
first firm’s interpretation of the effect of its price change on its demand. This uncertainty 
propagates back through production, employment, and ultimately its demand again. 
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In this model, the firms have a memory of several time steps and use moving 
averages of several time steps to estimate the success of their pricing and employment 
choices. We also experimented with very shallow memories in which the firms looked 
only at the last time period. In those simulations, we often found that the firms would 
repeatedly overcompensate and that the markets would diverge into unexpected corner 
solutions. We found that simple smoothing avoids some of the divergence issues 
encountered in other discrete simulations (e.g., Arifovic 1994), leads to more reasonable 
and robust results, and probably provides a more realistic firm behavior. 
Firms most directly experience the bottom-line impact of noise in their profits, which 
we observe in Figure 10. We can see that the monopoly profits quickly converge to 
equilibrium, whereas the competitive profits suffer from both short-run noise and long-
run oscillations. We illustrate this contrast more precisely in Figure 13, which plots the 
average of the firms’ standard deviation of profit (from Figure 10) for the 50 most recent 
time steps. We see that the average standard deviation of profit is on average seven fold 
higher in a competitive market than in a monopoly market. 
 
 
Figure 13. Variability in firms’ profits: Monopoly and competitive cases. 
While a terrorist attack arguably has direct impacts on households’ willingness to 
consume particular goods (or goods at all), such an attack could also create noise in 
markets that could easily be interpreted as economic instability or downturn. Consider an 
attack where a significant fraction of firms in an industry were disabled for a period of 
time. Endogenously, as implied by this model, output and employment could decrease 
and prices could increase sharply, as the remaining firms have a clearer picture of their 
customer-response functions. Furthermore, as the disabled firms return and rush to regain 
market share, the ensuing noise in prices, output, and employment could be interpreted by 
still-uneasy consumers as a floundering economy, thereby perpetuating a lack of 
confidence and poor performance in the embattled sector. The mechanics of such 
perpetuating perceptions needs to be better understood. 
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The comparison of the two sets of simulations also illustrates how competitive 
markets can, given constant demand, be “self-healing”: if during a disruption several 
firms are incapacitated, the remaining firms can use the new-found market power to 
increase profits, get clearer information on (an increased) demand, and stabilize until the 
incapacitated firms return. From this model, however, returning firms imply increased 
noise in goods and labor markets, creating instabilities. 
In general, this work demonstrates the nature of competition and full employment in 
a closed economy in which income effects are pervasive and the goods’ supply curve is 
explicitly tied to work effort. By capturing these output and employment features of the 
macroeconomy, we have demonstrated the appropriateness of agent-based models for 
microbased macroeconomic analysis, particularly the ability to define computable 
equilibria and analyze the conditions under which these equilibria are stable within 
“small” fluctuations. 
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4.0 Summary and Next Steps 
4.1 Summary 
In this report we describe an agent-based model of full employment in a productive 
economy. Households enter the labor force depending on the returns to working, and 
firms set prices that maximize profits given this level of employment. The equilibrium 
conditions of two specific cases were analyzed, the first in which there is a single 
monopoly firm in the goods market and the second in which there are five firms.  
We ran simulations of these two cases, each with a distinct computable equilibrium 
to which the simulations converged. This comparison of single-firm and multiple-firm 
markets demonstrates the traditional finding that a firm that would otherwise restrict 
output and charge monopoly prices is forced to competitive behavior in the presence of 
other firms. Our model finds this to be true (1) with a constant-returns-to-scale 
production technology, which removes any effects of firm size, and (2) with constant 
wages, which remove any effects of labor-demand market power on the part of firms. 
Competition leads to higher total production and consumption, with lower total producer 
surplus and higher average consumer surplus. Competition, however, also increases the 
“noise” in markets, making it more difficult for firms to get accurate demand signals. 
Comparing the two sets of simulations, competitive markets can have significant 
goods and labor market noise that confounds competition; one can easily imagine a firm 
in a socially optimal economy (see definition above) so confused by market signals that it 
“accidentally” fails. In the context of a terrorist attack, which is designed to propagate 
systemic fear and uncertainty across many people, accidental failures could be 
misinterpreted as terrorist-caused failures. Such false attribution, commonplace in 
financial markets, could perpetuate a reduction in consumer confidence throughout the 
economy. 
4.2 Next Steps 
To complete our general model of consumer confidence and terrorism-related shocks 
to the economy, two additional Aspen components are being developed. 
Modeling Economic Confidence 
Current work focuses on introducing time horizons into the decision process of both 
household and firm Aspen agents and on reintroducing financial markets to Aspen to 
better understand the role of confidence on full employment.   
Modeling Economic Shocks and Adjustments 
Since our Aspen simulations converge to the calculated equilibria, they provide a 
useful baseline for modeling the impacts of economic shocks and adjustments. In the case 
of shocks, we can study the behavior of an economy as it diverges from, and returns to, a 
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known full-employment level. In the case of adjustments, we can study the transition of 
the economy as it moves to a new full-employment level. We also intend to model the 
impact of shocks on confidence and expectations as well as the secondary effect on short-
run and long-run employment. As we develop increasingly complex models, we will 
continue to derive computable equilibria that validate agent behavior. 
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